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Abstract
We examine the eﬀect of local business taxation and local public good and service
(PIGS) provision on the number and spatial distribution of new ﬁrms. The analysis
draws on panel data for the universe of ﬁrm foundations in German municipalities,
matched to municipalities' local business tax rates and the level and structure of
their local PIGS provision. Methodologically, we estimate ﬁxed eﬀects poisson mo-
dels coupled with a control function approach. The results suggest that local business
taxation (PIGS provision) has a strong negative (positive) impact on the number of
new ﬁrms in the policy-changing jurisdiction. Local business taxes are, moreover,
found to exert beggar-thy-neighbor externalities on neigboring jurisdictions: tax re-
ductions strongly lower the number of neighbors' ﬁrm foundations, implying that the
aggregate number of new ﬁrms remains unchanged; while PIGS provision, on average,
exerts no signiﬁcant impact on the number of ﬁrms in adjacent jurisdictions, negative
eﬀects emerge for subsets of PIGS and ﬁrms.
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I. Introduction
Fostering the emergence of new businesses is a key concern for cities and municipa-
lities around the globe (e.g. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation (2016), Forbes
(2017)). Whether and which policies are eﬀective in channeling ﬁrm foundation
decisions and help to attract inter-jurisdictionally mobile new businesses is largely
indetermined though. The aim of this paper is to empirically identify the causal
eﬀect of ﬁscal policies, namely local business taxation and the provision of local
public goods and services (PIGS), on ﬁrm foundation rates. Our testing ground
is Germany, where local government spending - similar to other countries - signiﬁ-
cantly contributes to aggregate public spending and local governments, moreover,
autonomously set local business tax rates.1
To guide our empirical analysis, the paper starts out with a stylized theoretical
two-jurisdiction-model. The model predicts that lower local business taxes raise the
number of ﬁrm foundations in the policy-changing jurisdiction as more businesses
enter the market and interjurisdictionally mobile new ﬁrms are attracted from the
neighbouring locality. The latter eﬀect implies that local business taxation gives rise
to a beggar-thy-neighbour externality on the neighboring jurisdiction. Local PIGS
provision is, moreover, predicted to have an ambiguous eﬀect on the number of new
ﬁrms in both, the PIGS-providing municipality and the neighboring jurisdiction.
On the one hand, new PIGS spur ﬁrm entry in both jurisdiction (conditional on
the assumption that PIGS raise ﬁrm proﬁts in both localities). On the other hand,
the relative attractiveness of communities changes: the quantitative gain in pre-tax
1Local government spending makes up around 20-30% of overall government spending in developed
countries (see OECD Statistics on Government Expenditure by Function). In Germany, local
governments spent around 230 billion EURO in 2015 (see the website of the German Statistical
Oﬃce). German localities moreover autonomously set the local business tax rate and the local
property tax rate (with the latter being signiﬁcantly less important in revenue-terms). In general,
the level of sub-national tax autonomy signiﬁcantly varies across countries (with sub-national
governments in some countries having no tax instruments at hand at all).
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proﬁts is plausibly larger for ﬁrms in the PIGS-increasing jurisdiction, which boosts
its relative attractiveness and pulls in new ﬁrms that would have otherwise been
founded in the neighboring jurisdiction. If the PIGS-increasing locality also taxes
the additional PIGS-related proﬁts at a higher business tax rate and ﬁrms within its
borders, in consequence, obtain less PIGS-related after-tax beneﬁts than ﬁrms in the
neighoring jurisdiction, the eﬀect may be reversed though, making the prediction on
the overall link between PIGS and the number of new ﬁrms in the two jurisdictions
ambiguous.2
These predictions are brought to the data. We use Germany as a testing ground
and draw on panel information on the universe of ﬁrm foundations in German mu-
nicipalities linked to data on communities' local business tax choices and their local
PIGS provision. PIGS are modeled based on spending information from municipality
accounts, which is translated into PIGS capital stocks applying the perpetual inven-
tory method. The data allows us to diﬀerentiate between detailed PIGS categories,
including, e.g., spending for infrastructure, schools and recreational facilities. Met-
hodologically, we rely on ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson models, which absorb time constant
heterogeneity in ﬁrm foundation rates across German municipalities (see Guimarães
et al. (2003) and Arauzo-Carod and Manjón-Antolín (2012)).3 Following our theo-
retical predictions, we, moreover, allow for both, own and cross-municipality eﬀects
of business tax choices and PIGS provision, with the latter being modeled by spatial
lags of the regressors (see LeSage et al. 2009).
2The testing ground for our empirical analysis is Germany, where local business tax rates vary
widely across localities, among other reﬂecting heterogeneity in locality size and the presence of
agglomeration economies (see e.g. Koh et al. (2013)), partisanship of executive and legislative bo-
dies and electoral cycles (see e.g. Foremny and Riedel (2014), Freier and Odendahl (2015)). Note,
moreover, that while the government budget potentially links PIGS spending to local business
tax rate choices, our theoretical hypotheses are, in line with the existing literature, formulated as
ceteris paribus eﬀects of changes in one policy instrument conditional on the other.
3Guimarães et al. (2003) show that Poisson model estimates can be interpreted as estimates of a
Conditional Logit model and are therefore suitable to model location decisions. Arauzo-Carod
and Manjón-Antolín (2012), on top, show that the Poisson model can be used to determine the
eﬀects of geographically distributed regressors.
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To address remaining endogeneity concerns, we apply a control function appro-
ach, where the PIGS capital stock and the local business tax rate are instrumented
using two excluded instruments. PIGS spending is instrumented exploiting varia-
tion in local business tax revenues, and eventually local public spending, generated
by the `Renewable Energy Sources Act' (RES Act) of 2000. This Act was initiated
by the German federal government to promote energy production from renewable
sources. Among others, the law created strong incentives for ﬁrms to construct
wind power plants resulting in a substantial increase in the number of plants across
Germany. As wind power plants are subject to local taxation, local business tax
revenues of aﬀected municipalities increased. Speciﬁcally, our instrumental variable
strategy relies on diﬀerences in post-reform revenue and spending trends of com-
munities with high levels of wind strength and unpopulated space relative to other
localities - reﬂecting that wind power plants can only be built in areas with suﬃcient
wind and suﬃcient free space.
Moreover, the municipalities' local business tax rate is instrumented exploiting
variation in the so-called 'reference business tax' from the German municipal ﬁscal
equalization scheme. Municipal ﬁscal equalization is organized through ﬁscal trans-
fers from the state level to the municipality level if a municipality's ﬁscal capacity
falls short from its ﬁscal needs.4 The latter is a conceded budget per resident, the
former a measure for tax revenues at standardized tax rates (see e.g. Buettner and
Holm-Hadulla (2008)). Local business tax revenues add to localities' ﬁscal capacity
at such a standardized 'reference business tax rate'. This implies that, if the refe-
rence tax is larger than the municipality's actual tax rate, localities appear richer in
the equalization scheme than they actually are and vice versa. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that municipalities respond to changes in the position of their reference
tax relative to the actual tax rate: If the reference tax is increased above the actual
4If ﬁscal needs fall short from ﬁscal capacity, municipalities do not have to give up funds.
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rate, local municipal councils also tend to adjust the business tax rate upwards.
Following this line of argumentation, we instrument the local business tax choices
with a dummy variable indicating if the reference tax rate in the ﬁscal equalization
scheme is smaller or larger than a municipality's actual local business tax (where we
use the actual rate in a pre-sample period to avoid obvious endogeneity concerns).5
Based on these instruments, the control function approach is implemented. In a
ﬁrst step, we run four sets of ordinary least squares regressions, where municipalities'
PIGS provision, their local business tax and the spatial lags of these policy variables
are regressed on the described instruments, a set of control variables and the spatial
lag of all regressors. In a second step, the predicted residuals of these ﬁrst stage
regressions are included as regressors in the Poisson model for the number of new
ﬁrm foundations to retrieve consistent estimates (see e.g. Wooldridge 2010). We,
moreover, use bootstrapping to obtain valid standard errors. To correct for possible
violations of the underlying Poisson distribution, the bootstrapped standard errors
are, furthermore, clustered on the municipality level.
In line with our theoretical presumptions, our results suggest that local business
taxes exert a large negative eﬀect on the number of ﬁrm foundations in the policy-
changing jurisdiction. The estimated elasticity is −4.6 and thus in the range of
prior estimates, see e.g. Becker et al. (2012) and Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016).
We, furthermore, show that business taxation exerts a strong ﬁscal externality on
neighboring jurisdictions: Reducing the tax rate signiﬁcantly lowers the number of
ﬁrm foundations in other adjacent jurisdictions, implying that the aggregate number
of new ﬁrms is unaﬀected by the tax-change. This suggests that business taxation
largely serves as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy instrument.
5Note that time variation in the reference tax instrument hence relates to adjustments in the
reference tax only. Furthermore, as discussed below, additional locality revenues related to the
'Renewable Energy Sources Act' might also trigger adjustments in municipalities' local business
tax choices, which is accounted for in the ﬁrst-stage-regressions. See below for details.
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Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence for a positive eﬀect of PIGS on the number of ﬁrm
foundations in the policy-changing jurisdictions. Quantitatively, a 1%-increase in
a municipality's PIGS stock raises the number of new ﬁrm foundations by 0.78%
on average. For subsets of PIGS and subgroups of ﬁrms, the eﬀect turns out to
be even larger: A 1%-increase in PIGS targeted at families (e.g. public swimming,
schooling, youth services) raises the number of new ﬁrm foundations in industries
employing many workers who live with young children by 2.3%. While PIGS pro-
vision, moreover, on average does not signiﬁcantly impact on the number of new
ﬁrm foundations in neighbouring jurisdictions, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant externalities for
subsets of PIGS and subgroups of ﬁrms.
Our paper makes several contributions. Firstly, we add to a ﬂourishing empirical
literature on the eﬀect of corporate taxes on ﬁrms' investment and location choices.
While a negative link between federal corporate taxation and cross-country invest-
ment and location choices is well established (see e.g. Feld and Heckemeyer (2011)
for a recent survey), evidence for the regional and local level tends to be scarce (see
e.g. Brülhart et al. (2012), Becker et al. (2012), Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) and
Giroud and Rauh (2017) for exceptions). Our analysis, moreover, diﬀerentiates from
many prior papers by taking care of diﬀerent potential endogeneity problems: Fir-
stly, we combine a ﬁxed eﬀects framework with an instrumental variables approach
to account for a correlation of localities' policy choices with unobserved municipality
characteristics in the cross-sectional and longitudinal dimension; secondly, we allow
for externalities of policy choices on neighboring jurisdictions. Testing for potential
cross-jurisdictional eﬀects has been largely ignored in the prior literature, despite
the fact that allowing for such eﬀects is conceptually and economically important:
From a methodological point of view, estimates for tax and PIGS eﬀects on ﬁrm
activity in the policy-changing jurisdiction are biased if such externalities do exist
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and they are not accounted for in the empirical framework (as, technically speaking,
the stable unit treatment value assumption, SUTVA, is violated and 'control' muni-
cipalities adjacent to treated municipalities are also aﬀected by the policy change).6
On top, quantifying the size of ﬁscal externalities is economically important: ﬁscal
policy choices that exert externalities on neighboring jurisdictions render decentra-
lized policy-setting ineﬃcient and may call for a (re-)allocation of tax and spending
power to higher government tiers in federations.
Furthermore, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to provide a com-
prehensive analysis of the causal link between local PIGS and ﬁrm activity. While
a number of much-noted recent papers assesses whether economic activity is af-
fected by large supra-regional infrastructure projects, like the construction of dams,
motorways and railroads (see e.g. Duﬂo and Pande (2007), Donaldson (2018) and
Moeller and Zierer (2018)) and by place-based policies (see e.g. Neumark and Simp-
son (2015)), these policy interventions diﬀer from local public good provision in two
ways: Firstly, they are planned and ﬁnanced by the federal level, implying that ﬁscal
externalities (at the sub-national level) are ruled out by deﬁnition. Secondly, while
most supra-regional infrastructure projects directly increase ﬁrm productivity, many
local PIGS, like public swimming, parks, schooling and youth services, are ﬁrst and
foremost targeted at households. Our paper stresses that the latter may, neverthe-
less, spur local ﬁrm foundations as entrepreneurs might obtain beneﬁts from PIGS
provision and may, for that reason, relocate to PIGS-providing localities or because
a ﬁrm's workers might become more productive or may be willing to live and work
in a locality or region for a lower wage.7 As described above, our empirical results
6Note that instrumental variable strategies do not solve this problems if instruments are correlated
across space (as they plausibly often are, see below).
7Note that the literature paid some attention to the consequences of local schooling expenditures
on households by studying the eﬀect on student outcomes (see e.g. Jackson et al. (2016)) or
property prices (see e.g. Ries and Somerville (2010)). Potential eﬀects on ﬁrm behaviour have so
far been ignored though.
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conﬁrm a link between local PIGS and ﬁrm foundation rates.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section II, we present a
stylized theoretical model to guide our empirical approach. Section III describes the
institutional background of the empirical analysis and the data used. The estimation
strategy and empirical results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Considerations
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we develop a simple theoretical model to
guide our empirical approach. Consider a world with two communities j = 1, 2,
which are located at the end points of the unit interval. We denote the location of
municipality j by gj and assume g1 = 0 and g2 = 1. There is a mass 1 of ﬁrms
that are characterized by their location preferences. The bliss location point of ﬁrm
k is denoted by xk. We assume that bliss points are uniformly distributed across
the unit interval. Firm owners decide in which locality to locate by maximizing
their proﬁt after mobility costs which relate to moving away from the bliss location.
Mobility costs from locating at municipality j are given by m(|xk − gj|) = m(δkj ),
where δkj denotes the distance between ﬁrm k's location bliss point and municipality
j and m′(·) > 0.8
Municipalities control two policy instruments that aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁts: the cor-
porate income tax rate tj and the level of public input goods and services (PIGS)
cj. In the following, we will assume that PIGS raise ﬁrm proﬁts. The beneﬁt that a
ﬁrm located in municipality j receives from PIGS provision is denoted by Bj(c1, c2).
Assumptions. The function Bj(c1, c2) satisﬁes:
1.
∂Bj
∂cj
> 0.
8Note that we hence assume that ﬁrms may not be able to locate in a community at the location
of their bliss point. This may reﬂect zoning restrictions or that ﬁrm owners have a preference
to locate their business in their home residential community, which may, however, for business
reasons (e.g. market access) not be a suitable business location.
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2. ∂Bi
∂cj
> 0, i 6= j.
3. For any given PIGS level in municipality i, c¯i:
∂Bj(cj ,c¯i)
∂cj
>
∂Bi(cj ,c¯i)
∂cj
.
The ﬁrst assumption states that ﬁrms beneﬁt from higher PIGS provision in their
host municipality. This positive eﬀect on corporate proﬁtability may ﬁrstly relate
to PIGS provision that directly increases ﬁrm productivity, e.g. publicly funded
research and development centers. Alternatively, PIGS may help to lower input
costs; public infrastructure provision may e.g. lower transportation costs or PIGS
directed towards households may imply that employees are willing to work for lower
wages to enjoy the beneﬁts from regional amenities (e.g. recreation facilities, like
parks or public swimming).9 The second assumption states that increases in PIGS
also have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts in the neighbouring municipality. Roads
may e.g. also reduce transport costs for ﬁrms located in adjacent localities (if they,
for example, reduce the travel time to the next highway) or may beneﬁt workers in
neighbouring jurisdictions who are then willing to work for lower wages. Finally, the
third assumption states that the incremental PIGS beneﬁts to businesses decrease
with the distance to the PIGS providing community, i.e. ﬁrms located in community
i 6= j beneﬁt less from an increase in cj than ﬁrms located in locality j.
The proﬁt net of mobility cost and taxes of ﬁrm k when it locates in municipality
j is then given by
pikj = (1− tj)
(
V +Bj(c1, c2)− γm(δkj )
)− (1− γ)m(δkj )
= (1− tj)
(
V +Bj(c1, c2)
)− (1− γtj)m(δkj ),
where V is a location independent component of proﬁts and 0 < γ < 1 denotes
9Bj may also be interpreted as the PIGS-related utility of an enterpreneur when he locates in
community j. In this case, a link between local PIGS and Bj may not only be established via
changes in ﬁrm proﬁts but might also emerge because the enterpreneur obtains direct beneﬁts
from PIGS provision (like public swimming or parks) when locating in jurisdiction j.
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the fraction of mobility cost that are tax deductible. Each ﬁrm has to make two
decisions: ﬁrst, it has to decide whether to enter the market, and second, conditional
on entry, it has to decide in which community to locate. We begin the analysis with
the second decision.
Location Choice. A ﬁrm with bliss point x locates in municipality 1 if
∆(x) ≡ pik1 − pik2 =
(t2 − t1)V +
(
(1− t1)B1(c1, c2)− (1− t2)B2(c1, c2)
)
+ (1− γt2)m(1− x)− (1− γt1)m(x) ≥ 0
To rule out cases where all ﬁrms locate in one municipality, we assume that m(1)
is suﬃciently high. The optimal location decision rule and and how it depends on
municipalities' policy choices is stated in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique cutoﬀ value x¯ such that ﬁrms with location bliss
point xk ≤ x¯ locate at municipality 1 and ﬁrms with location bliss point xk > x¯
locate at municipality 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. x¯ is a function of t1, t2, c1 and c2 where
1. x¯ decreases in t1 and increases in t2.
2. The impact of higher PIGS provision on x¯ is ambiguous.
• x¯ shifts to the right in response to an increase in c1 if
(1− t1)∂B1
∂c1
> (1− t2)∂B2
∂c1
,
and shifts to the left otherwise.
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• Analogously, x¯ shifts to the right in response to an increase in c2 if
(1− t1)∂B1
∂c2
> (1− t2)∂B2
∂c2
,
and shifts to the left otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1, intuitively, states that a municipality becomes a less attractive ﬁrm
location when its business tax rate increases. Lemma 2.2 shows that PIGS provision
also aﬀects the relative attractiveness of communities as a ﬁrm location, with the sign
depending on the incremental net-of-tax-beneﬁt of higher PIGS provision for ﬁrms in
the two jurisdictions. As stated in the assumptions, the incremental pre-tax beneﬁt
of PIGS is assumed to be larger for ﬁrms in the PIGS-providing jurisdiction. This,
however, does not necessarily imply that the PIGS-increasing jurisdiction becomes
the more attractive place for ﬁrm location: If its business tax rate is suﬃciently
larger than the tax in the other jurisdiction, the higher marginal pre-tax PIGS-
beneﬁts may be eaten up by the higher tax levy. Intuitively, this becomes more
likely if the diﬀerence between the pre-tax beneﬁts from PIGS earned by ﬁrms in
the two jurisdictions is small (i.e. when the beneﬁts of PIGS provision fade out
slowly with distance).10
Entry. We now turn to ﬁrms' decisions to enter into the market or not. To en-
dogenize the number of ﬁrms that enter, we assume that the location independent
10Note that our stylized theoretical model, in line with our empirical setup below and the existing
literature, makes ceteris paribus predictions on how ﬁrm choices depend on local business tax
rates and PIGS provision respectively, conditional on the choice of the other policy instrument.
Note, moreover, that in our empirical setting local business tax rates vary widely across jurisdicti-
ons, which may root in heterogeneity across localities in various dimensions, including the size
of jurisdictions or the partisan composition of legislative and executive bodies, see also Footnote
2. As our empirical analysis is concerned with the impact of ﬁscal policies on ﬁrm behaviour, we
refrain from analysing governments' optimal policy choices in our theoretical framework.
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component of ﬁrm proﬁts V is a random variable with distribution function F (v)
and strictly positive density f(v).11 A ﬁrm with bliss point x ≤ x¯ enters into
municipality 1 only if
(1− t1)
(
V +B1(c1, c2)
)− (1− γt1)m(x) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
V ≥ 1− γt1
1− t1 m(x)−B1(c1, c2) ≡ v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2).
It can easily be checked that v¯1 increases in t1 implying that under a higher corporate
tax rate only ﬁrms with higher draws for V will ﬁnd it optimal to enter. This
reﬂects that higher corporate tax rates reduce ﬁrm proﬁts and thus incentives to
enter. Analogously, v¯1 decreases in both c1 and c2 implying that PIGS provision in
either municipality spurs entry.
The total mass of ﬁrms locating at municipality 1, M1, can be calculated as
M1 =
∫ x¯
0
prob(V ≥ v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))dx =
∫ x¯
0
[
1− F(v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))]dx.
Analogously, a ﬁrm with location bliss point x > x¯ enters into municipality 2 if
(1− t2)
(
V +B2(c1, c2)
)− (1− γt2)m(1− x) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
V ≥ 1− γt2
1− t2 m(1− x)−B2(c1, c2) ≡ v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2),
yielding a total mass of entering ﬁrms in municipality 2
M2 =
∫ 1
x¯
prob(V ≥ v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2))dx =
∫ 1
x¯
[
1− F(v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2))]dx.
It is now straight forward to assess how changes in the corporate income tax rate
and PIGS provision aﬀect the number of ﬁrms in both municipalities.
11Notice that we assume that the distribution of V is independent from the location bliss point.
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Consider ﬁrst an increase in t2. Notice that a change in t2 aﬀects two cutoﬀ
values. First, the location cutoﬀ x¯ below which ﬁrms locate in municipality 1 and,
second, the cutoﬀ value for the location independent components of ﬁrm proﬁts
v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2) and v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2), above which ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to enter. By
Lemma 2, the increase in t2 shifts x¯ to the right. Moreover, a higher value of t2
increases v¯2 (see above) and thus reduces incentives to enter in municipality 2, while
it leaves proﬁts of ﬁrms locating in municipality 1 and thus v¯1 unaﬀected. Hence,
higher tax rates in municipality 2 unambiguously increase (decrease) the mass of
ﬁrms in municipality 1 (2). Formally, applying Leibnitz' Rule yields
∂M1
∂t2
=
∂
∂t2
∫ x¯(t2)
0
[
1− F(v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))]dx
=
∫ x¯(t2)
0
∂
∂t2
[
1− F(v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))]dx+ [1− F(v¯1(x¯, t1, c1, c2))] ∂x¯
∂t2
= −
∫ x¯
0
f(v¯1)
∂v¯1
∂t2︸︷︷︸
=0
dx+
[
1− F(v¯1)] ∂x¯
∂t2
=
[
1− F(v¯1)] ∂x¯
∂t2
> 0,
where we suppressed the dependence of the functions v¯1 and x¯ on their arguments
for notational simplicity. Analogously,
∂M2
∂t2
=
∂
∂t2
∫ 1
x¯(t2)
[
1− F(v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2))]dx
= −
∫ 1
x¯
f(v¯2)
∂v¯2
∂t2
dx−
[
1− F(v¯2)] ∂x¯
∂t2
< 0.
The analysis for changes in t1 is analogous.
Next, we analyse how PIGS provision in municipality 2 aﬀects the mass of ﬁrms
in both municipalities. Notice again that a change in c2 aﬀects both the location
cutoﬀ x¯ and the entry cutoﬀs v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2) and v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2). The change in the
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mass of ﬁrms at municipality 1 and 2 can be calculated by diﬀerentiating M1 and
M2. Applying Leibnitz' Rule yields
∂M1
∂c2
=
∂
∂c2
∫ x¯(c2)
0
[
1− F(v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))]dx
=
∫ x¯(c2)
0
∂
∂c2
[
1− F(v¯1(x, t1, c1, c2))]dx+ [1− F(v¯1(x¯, t1, c1, c2))] ∂x¯
∂c2
= −
∫ x¯
0
f(v¯1)
∂v¯1
∂c2
dx+
[
1− F(v¯1)] ∂x¯
∂c2
.
The analogous expression for municipality 2 is
∂M2
∂c2
=
∂
∂c2
∫ 1
x¯(c2)
[
1− F(v¯2(x, t2, c1, c2))]dx
= −
∫ 1
x¯
f(v¯2)
∂v¯2
∂c2
dx−
[
1− F(v¯2)] ∂x¯
∂c2
.
The change in the mass of ﬁrms depends on two terms: the ﬁrst term reﬂects
entry incentives, while the second term reﬂects location choices. The ﬁrst terms
are both positive12 reﬂecting that higher PIGS provision increases proﬁts in both
municipalities, thus spurring entry. The sign of the second term is ambiguous in
both expressions. By Lemma 2,
∂x¯
∂c2
< 0 if (1− t2)∂B2
∂c2
> (1− t1)∂B1
∂c2
In this case, higher PIGS provision in municipality 2 makes municipality 2 the
more attractive location leading to an increase in M2. In municipality 1, however,
the positive entry eﬀect is opposed by the higher propensity of ﬁrms to locate in
municipality 2 yielding an ambiguous overall eﬀect for the change inM1. Conversely,
if ∂x¯/∂c2 > 0, municipality 1 gains ﬁrms while the eﬀect on municipality 2 is
12As ∂v¯1/∂c2 and ∂v¯2/∂c2, are both negative, see above.
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ambiguous. The analysis is analogous for changes in c1.
Summarizing, we arrive at two predictions: Firstly, lower corporate tax rates are
predicted to increase the mass of new ﬁrms in the policy-changing jurisdiction and
decrease the mass of new ﬁrms in the other municipality. Secondly, the eﬀect of
PIGS on ﬁrm entry is ambiguous for both municipalities.
III. Institutional Background and Data
In the following, these predictions will be brought to the data. The testing ground
are ﬁrm foundations in West German municipalities. This section describes the
institutional background and the data set used for the empirical analysis.
A. Institutional Background
Municipalities in Germany are the lowest institutional legislative jurisdiction. They
have self elected legislative governments and have the right to solve any local matters
autonomously (Article 28 of the German constitution). Localities generate income
from two main sources. First, a fraction of the personal income tax and the value
added tax revenue administered at the federal and state level are distributed to
German municipalities based on ﬁscal rules.
Second, localities autonomously set the local business tax rate, which is levied on
business earnings of incorporated and non-incorporated ﬁrms located within a com-
munity's borders. The deﬁnition of the business tax base is determined by federal
law and is thus homogenous across municipalities. The tax signiﬁcantly contributes
to the tax burden on businesses in Germany and is also the most important revenue
instrument at German communities' own discretion.13 The business tax multiplier
set by German municipalities is measured in business tax points and is multiplied by
13Communities also levy a local property tax which is, however, a signiﬁcantly less important
revenue source than the local business tax.
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a base rate ('Messzahl') chosen at the federal level when calculating a ﬁrm's tax levy.
In our sample period, a proportional base rate of 5% applied for corporations (and
for non-incorporated ﬁrms on income above EUR 48,000 (Par. 11 Local Business
Tax Act)).14 Note, moreover, that the majority of local tax revenues remains with
the locality. Only a minor fraction is redistributed by ﬁscal equalization schemes.
German municipalities also provide various local public goods and services, e.g.
related to the construction and maintenance of roads, sewerage, kindergartens and
primary schools. Further, municipalities have to provide social beneﬁts to the unem-
ployed and social welfare recipients. Additionally, public goods and services related
to culture and sport facilities, tourism, and public transport may be provided. Note
that while some expenditures are mandatory, including administration, social secu-
rity and ﬁnancing liabilities, others are optional, including e.g. spending for theaters,
youth centers, the promotion of science, health care, sport and recreation facilities.
B. Data
As described above, our empirical analysis assesses the eﬀect of business taxes and
local PIGS on the number of ﬁrm foundations. The analysis draws on data from
diﬀerent sources.15 First, we use data on the number of ﬁrm foundations in German
municipalities between 1998 and 2006, speciﬁcally the total number of newly registe-
red corporate enterprises, partnerships and self employed people (full time and with
at least 1 employee) per municipality drawn from the Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik of
14As will be stated below, the average local business tax multiplier set by localities within our
sample is 339 business tax points. Multiplied with a base rate of 5%, this translates in a tax
levy of around 17% (with this calculation ignoring that ﬁrms' eﬀective tax burdens are also
determined by the deductibility of local business tax payments from the local business tax base).
15Note that our sample period saw a moderate number of mergers and separations of West German
municipalities. Despite the limited importance of this issue, we account for possible changes of
municipality borders. Speciﬁcally, we take the municipality structure at December 31, 2007 as
a baseline and use publicly available information on mergers and separation to calculate values
for the 2007-municipalities in all other sample years. If two municipalities e.g. joined in 2007,
their expenditures for prior sample years are calculated as the sum of their separate values.
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the German State Statistical Oﬃces.16 Note that the registration of a new branch
will also be counted as a new foundation and that, by law, owners are required
to register any new business. Figure (1) shows a histogram of the number of ﬁrm
foundations in our sample in 2001.17 In the empirical analysis to come, we will drop
municipalities with a population greater 300,000 to exclude dominant cities (like
Munich or Cologne) that act as outliers in the data.18 Our ﬁnal data set comprises
8,130 municipalities.
This data is augmented by information on the local business tax rate set by
German communities and their local public good and service provision. The PIGS
information stems from disaggregated accounting data of German municipalities
between 1992 and 2006 provided in the Jahresrechnungsstatistik of the State Sta-
tistical Oﬃces. The data comprises information for diﬀerent spending categories.
In the analysis to come, we will focus on autonomous spending by German com-
munities, i.e. disregard community spending that is mandatory by German law
(e.g. spending for housing support paid to welfare recipients) or organized through
higher administrative units like counties. This leaves us with administrative and
capital expenditures by German municipalities for (a) public security, (b) schools,
(c) public education and culture, (d) child and youth care, (e) health, recreation
and sports, (f) public transportation and parking, (g) construction and housing,
(h) municipality streets as well as (j) economic promotion.19 We will apply the
16Note that theGewerbeanzeigenstatistik is available since 1998. We, moreover, restrict the analysis
to years prior to 2006 as information on PIGS spending from German municipality accounts (see
below) fails to be available in consistent format before and after 2007 due to a change in the
German municipality accounting system in 2007.
17The ﬁgure is based on a sample of municipalities with a number of ﬁrm foundations less than
the 95% quantile of the ﬁrm foundation distribution in 2001.
18Moreover, we exclude city-states (Bremen and Hamburg) from the analysis.
19Public security comprises spending for police, ﬁre ﬁghters, public order and ambulance services;
spending for schools comprises spending for school buildings and facilities for primary and se-
condary schools located in the community; spending for culture and public education comprises
spending for science and research, museums, theatres and concert halls, public libraries, regio-
nal traditions and monuments; spending for child and youth care comprises spending for public
youth services and family-related services; spending for health, sport and recreation comprises
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perpetual inventory method to generate values for the actual PIGS stock of each
municipality (in diﬀerent PIGS categories). To do so, we calculate the initial stock
value K0 using expenditure information for the pre-sample period 1992 to 1997 with
K0 =
EXP
ggdp +
1
T
. (1)
where EXP stands for the mean PIGS expenditures between 1992 to 1997, ggdp for
the GDP growth rate and T for the average operating life. Note that we will assume
a GDP growth rate of 2%.
We assume linear depreciation of the initial capital stock. Depreciation rates
are calculated using publicly available information about operating lifes of assets in
the diﬀerent spending categories. Investment is represented by capital expenditures
for a speciﬁc PIGS category in every year. Additionally, we add administration
expenditures in every year, but assume 100% depreciation of the latter within one
year. Hence, the PIGS capital stock C`,i,t of asset ` in municipality i at time t reads
C`,i,t =
T∑`
k=0
EXP`,i,t−`
(
1− k
T`
)
+ ADM`,i,t (2)
with EXP`,i,t depicting capital expenditures, ADM`,i,t administration expenditures
and T` the average operating life of asset category `. We assume that the expendi-
tures in 1992 (the starting year of our data) are equal to the capital expenditures
plus the initial capital stock K0. Hence, expenditures before 1992 are assumed to
be equal to 0. Note that the capital stock in equation (2) is constructed for the
spending for sport facilities and sport support, public swimming, gardens and parks; spending
for public transportation and parking comprises spending for street lightning and cleaning, the
construction and maintenance of parking spaces as well as public transport services; spending for
construction and housing comprises spending for public building authorities, urban planning and
construction as well as housing promotion; spending for streets comprises spending for munici-
pality streets only - the construction and maintenance of streets that cross municipality borders
like highways are the responsibility of federal or state governments.
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diﬀerent PIGS categories described above and then summed up to a total PIGS
capital stock per municipality.
Finally, we add socio-economic municipality characteristics to our data. The
latter include information on municipal population in 1000, the unemployment rate,
the share of low, medium and high skilled workers and the number of students (per
1000 inhabitants) and doctors (per 100,000 inhabitants).20
Figure 1: Histogram of Firm Foundations in 2001
Descriptive statistics are presented in Figure (2) and in Table (1). Figure (2)
depicts our sample municipalities' average PIGS stock per PIGS category relative
20Note that information on the share of workers, the number of students and the number of doctors
is available at the county level only.
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the total PIGS capital stock in the year 2006. The ﬁgure indicates that the largest
fraction of the PIGS stock of German municipalities is associated with schools,
followed by child- and youth care as well as streets, public transport and parking
and recreational facilities. PIGS related to culture, public education, economic
promotion and social security are, in quantitative terms, less important.
Figure 2: Average Share of PIGS Stocks in 2006
Table (1) moreover shows that the average municipality in our data observes
around 11 ﬁrm foundations per year and has 6,700 inhabitants. The average PIGS
capital stock is 30.4 Million Euro and the average PIGS stock per inhabitant 5139
Euros, with signiﬁcant variation across municipalities though. Moreover, the average
local business tax multiplier set by our sample jurisdictions is 339 business tax
points, which multiplied with a base rate ('Messzahl') of 5% (see above) translates
into a local business tax rate of around 17% (see also Footnote 14).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Pctl(25) Pctl(75)
# of Firm Foundations 10.65 32.32 0.00 8.00
Population in 1,000 6.71 16.79 0.82 6.02
Unemployment Rate in % 5.35 1.82 4.00 6.40
Share of Low Skilled Workers in % 17.55 2.97 15.20 19.70
Share of Medium Skilled Workers in % 63.29 3.75 60.60 65.90
Share of High Skilled Workers in % 5.61 2.30 4.20 6.20
Students per 1,000 Inhabitants 5.18 14.98 0.00 3.20
Doctors per 100,000 Inhabitants 131.93 22.84 121.40 139.20
Local Business Tax Multiplier 339.02 31.12 320.00 352.00
Total PIGS Stock in 1 Mio. Euro 30.44 68.40 3.59 30.35
Total PIGS Stock per Capita in Euro 5,139.12 2,327.23 3,672.67 6,083.29
Observations 8130
Notes: Calculations are based on the year 2006 and include 8,130 municipalities. The
total PIGS stock per capita is calculated based on the localities' population in the
pre-sample year 1997. Information on the number of ﬁrm foundations per municipality
stems from the Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik, PIGS information from the Jahresrechnung-
statistik, data on municipalities' local business tax rates, population and unemployment
rates from Statistik Lokal, all provided by the German Statistical Oﬃce. Data on skil-
led workers, students and doctors is drawn from the INKAR data provided by the
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aﬀairs and Spatial Development.
IV. Estimating Fiscal Policy Effects on Firm Foundation
A. Baseline Estimation
To test for a link between local business taxes, PIGS and ﬁrm foundations, we
estimate a model of the following form
E (yit|Xit, Cit, Tit, λi, δt) = exp (γXit + β1Cit + β2Tit + λi + δt) (3)
where yit denotes the number of ﬁrm foundations in jurisdiction i at time t, Cit
the value of the total PIGS capital stock, Tit the local business tax and Xit the
vector of socio-economic control variables described above. This latter includes mu-
nicipalities' number of inhabitants, implying that the model accounts for potential
eﬀects related to PIGS usage rivalry.21 Additionally, we control for municipality
21We believe that accounting for potential PIGS rivalry eﬀects by adding population as a control
regressor is superior to scaling the PIGS variable by population as the former, contrary to the
latter, does allow for but does not impose rivalry eﬀects. When using the PIGS capital stock
scaled by population as regressor, we obtain qualitatively similar but quantitatively somewhat
larger results than the ones reported in this paper.
20
ﬁxed eﬀects λi and time ﬁxed eﬀects δt. We calculate cluster robust standard errors
on the municipality level to allow for deviations from the Poisson distribution (see
Wooldridge 2010).
The estimation results for Equation 3 are presented in Table B1 in the online
appendix. The ﬁndings suggest that local business taxes (PIGS) exert a signiﬁcantly
negative (positive) eﬀect on the number of new ﬁrm foundations. In quantitative
terms, both eﬀects turn out to be moderate in size.22
We do not consider these estimates to retrieve causal eﬀects though. While the
ﬁxed eﬀects approach in Equation 3 rules out omitted variable bias related to time-
constant unobserved factors, the estimated coeﬃcients may still be biased by reverse
causality or by time-varying unobserved correlates of municipalities' policy choices
and the number of new businesses. If localities, for example, respond to declines in
local economic activity and ﬁrm foundation rates with countercyclical ﬁscal policies
(i.e. increases in PIGS spending or reductions of the local business tax rate), our
baseline estimates would be biased towards zero.
B. Control Function Approach and Spatial Eﬀects
To address these concerns, we set up the following control function approach
First Stage:
Cit = γ1Xit + γ2Zit + λi + δt + νit
Tit = γ1Xit + γ2Zit + λi + δt + µit
Second Stage:
E[yit|Rit] = exp (γXit + β1Cit + β2Tit + λi + δt + νit + µit) (4)
22Note that the coeﬃcients of a Poisson regression can be interpreted as semi-elasticies (see e.g.
Cameron and Trivedi (2005)).
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with νit and µit denoting the predicted residuals calculated from regressing Cit and
Tit on the control variables Xit and the excluded instruments Zit using ordinary
least squares.23 Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 draws to obtain valid
standard errors when instrumenting the PIGS capital stock and the local business
tax rate.
We make use of two instruments. The PIGS capital stock is instrumented using
variation generated by the `Renewable Energy Sources Act' (RES Act) of 2000. This
Act was initiated by the German state to promote energy production from renewa-
ble sources. Among others, the law created heavy subsidies for ﬁrms constructing
wind power plants resulting in a substantial increase in the number of plants across
Germany. Wind power plants are subject to local taxation and directly increase lo-
cal business tax revenues. We hence expect that localities that attracted new wind
power plants in the wake of the RES Act observed a surge in their local tax reve-
nue and in consequence their local spending.24 Our instrument exploits that wind
power plants, to maximize energy output, are only built in areas with high wind
strength and suﬃcient free/unpopulated space. The latter follows from the fact that
guidelines for approving the construction of wind power plants in Germany state
that the typical distance of an energy production area with seven wind power plants
from the next local town should be at least 1500 meters. Following this notion, our
instrument captures diﬀerences in the emergence of spending behaviour of localities
with low levels of wind and/or little free agricultural space and localities with both,
high levels of wind and free agricultural space, after the passing of the RES Act in
2000.
23
Rit = {Xi, Cit, Tit, λi, δt, νit, µit} represents our set of regressors.
24Our ﬁrst stage results conﬁrm the notion that communities with high levels of wind strength and
signiﬁcant free agricultural space increased their local PIGS spending in the wake of the RES
Act (see below). Alternatively, localities might respond to the additional tax revenue from the
new wind power plant activity by lowering their local business tax rates. Our ﬁrst stage models
allow for this possibility as we also augment the ﬁrst stage model for the local business tax rate
by the described wind energy instrument.
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Figure 3: Quantiles of Mean Wind Strength and Agricultural Land
(a) Mean Wind Strength in 80m Height (b) Mean Agricultural Land
Notes: The ﬁgure depicts the quantiles of mean wind strength in 80m height and mean fraction of
agricultural land in West German communities. Darker colors are associated with higher quantiles.
To construct the instrument, we will use the mean wind strength (from 1981 to
2000, provided by the German Weather Service) in a height of 80 meters and the
total agricultural land in km2 within German municipalities. Figure (3) depicts 1%
quantiles of these variables graphically. Darker colors are associated with higher
quantiles. The ﬁgure suggests that wind strength and agricultural land vary sub-
stantially between localities. Especially localities in the North-West of Germany (in
Lower-Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) are likely to observe high wind strength and
suﬃcient agricultural land. The empirical analysis to come will rely on variation
in wind strength and free agricultural space within states by including a full set of
state-year ﬁxed eﬀects as control variables.
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Furthermore note that the construction of the instrument relies on the assump-
tion that (most of) the proﬁts of wind turbines are taxed in the host location of the
wind turbine. If local wind power plants are organized within separate legal entities,
this obviously holds true.25 If they are part of larger groups that span several juris-
dictions, the local business tax base is apportioned across jurisdictions according to
a formula apportionment system with proﬁt consolidation at the federal level and
payroll apportionment. While the operation of wind power plants commonly does
not involve any labour and thus wage payments, the German local business tax law
acknowledges that the allocation of the tax base does not have to be based on the
payroll factor if this mechanism leads to an unfair tax base allocation (Art. 33,
Local Business Tax Law). Anecdotal evidence suggests that, during our sample pe-
riod, wind turbine jurisdictions received a signiﬁcant fraction of wind turbine proﬁts
based on this legal provision and the notion that there is, in general, little labour
involved in electricity generation. Langenmayr and Simmler (2018) simulate wind
turbine proﬁts in Germany assuming that proﬁts are taxed in the host jurisdiction
of the wind turbine. When regressing the observed actual local business tax base
on the simulated proﬁts, they ﬁnd a strong correlation between the two measures.26
Furthermore note that we will cross-check the sketched instrumental variable
strategy by also running regressions where we instrument locality spending with
agricultural land used for corn production in German municipalities interacted with
post RES 2000 reform indicators. The rationale for that robustness check is that
25Note that wind power plants, if organized in separate legal entities, commonly are set up as
unincorporated businesses. As these entities do not employ any personal, they are not counted
as a ﬁrm foundation in the deﬁnition of our dependent variable. We are hence conﬁdent that our
main estimates do not pick up mechanical eﬀects related to the foundation of entities for wind
power plants. To corroborate this point, we present robustness checks below.
26After our sample period, from 2009 onwards, an explicit allocation mechanism for wind turbines
was introduced in the local business tax law, stating that 30% of the tax base from wind tur-
bine activity are to be allocated according to wages (and thus, commonly, to the management
jurisdiction of the group) and 70% are to be allocated according to ﬁxed assets, excluding oﬃce
furniture and equipment (and thus, commonly, to the wind turbine jurisdiction) (Art. 29, Par.
2 Local Business Tax Law).
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the introduction of the RES Act also heavily subsidized bio-energy production and
thereby increased prices for corn and thus proﬁts of corn-farmers, which again are
subject to local business taxation (see, e.g., Habermann and Breustedt (2011).27
On top of that, the local business tax rate is instrumented with the so-called
'reference business tax' from the German municipal ﬁscal equalization scheme. Mu-
nicipal ﬁscal equalization is organized through ﬁscal transfers from the state level
to the municipality level. If a municipality's ﬁscal capacity falls short from its ﬁscal
needs, it receives funds from the state level (while it commonly does not have to
give up funds if ﬁscal needs fall short from ﬁscal capacity). Note that ﬁscal needs
are a conceded budget per resident, while ﬁscal revenues are a measure for tax reve-
nues at standardized tax rates.28 Local business tax revenues add to localities' ﬁscal
capacity at such a standardized 'reference business tax rate'. This implies that, if
the reference tax is larger than the municipality's actual tax rate, localities appear
richer in the equalization scheme than they actually are and vice versa. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that municipalities respond to changes in the position of their re-
ference tax relative to the actual tax rate: If the reference tax is increased above the
actual rate, local municipal councils, with an elevated propensity, adjust the busi-
ness tax rate upwards (see e.g. IHK (2016)).29 Following this line of argumentation,
we instrument the local business tax choices with a dummy variable indicating if the
reference tax rate in the ﬁscal equalization scheme is smaller or larger than a muni-
cipality's actual local business tax rate. To avoid obvious endogeneity concerns, the
27Since agricultural land use data is not available on the municipality level, we use county level
information on the share of agricultural land used for corn production multiplied with the size
of agricultural land in a jurisdiction to construct the variable.
28The rationale for measuring ﬁscal capacity as tax revenues at standardized rather than actual
tax rates is to avoid that municipalities lower their local business and property tax rates in order
to lower their ﬁscal capacity in the ﬁscal equalization scheme.
29Note that, from a theoretical perspective, all communities have an incentive to raise their local
business tax rate in response to a reference tax increase. As outlined in the text, anecdotal
evidence and our empirical analysis, however, show that this incentive is particularly pronounced
for localities whose local business tax was above the reference tax before and is below after.
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reference tax is compared to the actual rate in a pre-sample period (1997), implying
that time variation in the reference tax instrument relates to adjustments in the
reference tax only.
Furthermore, we extend the sketched control function approach by adding the
spatial lags of the tax and PIGS regressors to the estimation model. This serves two
purposes: Firstly, it allows us to test for ﬁscal externalities of tax and PIGS choices
on other jurisdictions, which is relevant from an economic perspective as the presence
of such externalities renders decentralized policy-making ineﬃcient. The related
results hence inform policy debates on the assignment of tax and spending rights
across government tiers. Moreover, adding the spatial lag of the policy variables
is necessary to avoid bias in the coeﬃcient estimates that capture the tax and
PIGS eﬀects on the foundation of new ﬁrms in the policy-changing jurisdictions. To
see this, consider a jurisdiction that decreases its local business tax rate. If policy
choices are positively correlated across space (which tax competition models suggest
they are, see e.g. Devereux et al. (2008)), this tax reduction triggers a decrease in
the local business tax of neighbouring localities as well. While the decline in the
host jurisdiction tax exerts a positive eﬀect on the number of ﬁrm foundations, the
decrease in neighboring communities' tax rates is expected to depress the number of
ﬁrm foundations in the considered jurisdiction. If spatial eﬀects are not modelled,
the coeﬃcient estimate for the jurisdiction's own tax variable captures the joint
eﬀect of both tax policy adjustments and hence underestimates the impact of the
own tax instrument in absolute terms. Analogous considerations, moreover, apply
in the PIGS dimension.
Furthermore note that this type of endogeneity problem is not solved by instru-
menting for the own-policy eﬀects as described above if changes in the instruments
are correlated across space.30 We hence account for spatial lags of the PIGS capital
30Such correlations plausibly often do exist: In our case, the exposure to wind and the availability
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stock in our control function model, treating the policy variables as well as the spa-
tial lags as endogenous. Speciﬁcally, we estimate four ﬁrst stage equations which
regress the local business tax, the PIGS stock and the spatial lags of the two policy
measures on the wind instrument and the reference tax instrument sketched above
as well as the spatial lags of the instruments and the set of control variables and
their spatial lags. The predicted residuals from the four ﬁrst stage regressions are
included as regressors in the second stage model.
Finally note that the spatial lags are calculated based on a spatial weighting
matrix that accounts for neighbors within 15km distance (baseline), 20km and 40
km (robustness check) respectively, measured as the Great-Circle distance between
municipality centroids. Values of the weighting matrix correspond to the inverse
distance between neighboring municipalities (baseline), to uniform weights and the
inverse distance squared between neighboring localities (robustness checks) respecti-
vely and take on the value of zero for non-neighbors (where the matrix is row-
standardized such that the weights add up to 1).
Estimation Results
The baseline estimates for our control function approach are reported in Ta-
ble 2 and Table B2 in Appendix B, with Table 2 (Table B2) depicting the results
of the second (ﬁrst) stage model. First stage result patterns are as expected and
conﬁrm our considerations in the previous chapter. The second stage models con-
ﬁrm a statistically signiﬁcant impact of local business tax and PIGS choices on ﬁrm
foundation rates. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present control function models,
where the local business tax rate and the PIGS stock are included as sole policy
regressors. Speciﬁcation (3) jointly includes both policy variables and Speciﬁcation
(4) estimates the full model additionally including the spatial lags of the policy re-
of agricultural land may very well be correlated across space as may be changes in the position
of the jurisdiction's tax rate relative to the reference tax.
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gressors. The coeﬃcient estimates for the local business tax and the PIGS stock
turn out negative and statistically signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations. Quantitatively,
the control function estimates are signiﬁcantly larger than the baseline estimates in
absolute terms, suggesting that endogeneity issues along the lines discussed above
bias coeﬃcient estimates in the baseline setting. Speciﬁcation (4) suggests that the
elasticity of ﬁrm foundations w.r.t. local business tax changes amounts to -4.6.31
This is comparable to recent estimates in regional contexts by Becker et al. (2012)
for Germany and by Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) for the US, but tends to be at
the upper end of estimated business activity responses to corporate taxation in inter-
national contexts (see e.g. deMooji and Ederveen (2003) and Feld and Heckemeyer
(2011) for surveys).
Table 2: Control Function Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Business Tax -0.0083*** -0.0084*** -0.0137**
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0055)
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0188***
(0.0065)
Total PIGS Stock 0.0199** 0.0120 0.0257***
(0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0086)
Total PIGS Stock, Spatial Lag 0.0327
(0.0273)
N 70653 70653 70653 70653
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Controls X X X X
Control Functions X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. The table reports the second stage results for
the control function approach presented above, where the local business tax, the
PIGS stock and the spatial lag of the two variables are treated as endogenous. The
dependent variable is the number of ﬁrm foundations per municipality and year.
Spatial lags are constructed based on neighbors within 15 km distances and inverse-
distance weighting. The model includes a full set of state-year ﬁxed eﬀects and the
control variables described in Section 3 as well as their spatial lags.
Speciﬁcation (4), moreover, yields a positive and quantitatively large coeﬃcient
estimate for the spatial lag of the local business tax variable, suggesting that higher
business taxes push out new ﬁrms to locate in neighboring localities. As the point
31Note that a 1%-change in the local business tax rate corresponds to an increase by 3.39 business
tax points on average (cf. Table 1), which according to the estimate translates in a drop in the
number of new ﬁrms by 4.644%(= 3.39 · (−0.0137)).
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estimates for the own tax eﬀects and the spatial lag do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in
absolute terms, the results point to strong beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀects: increases
in the number of ﬁrm foundations when local business taxes decline are suggested
to largely reﬂect that businesses are attracted from neighboring jurisdictions as
opposed to the emergence of genuinely new economic activity.
The model, moreover, suggests that PIGS exert a signiﬁcantly positive impact on
the number of new ﬁrms in the policy-changing jurisdiction. In quantitative terms,
the elasticity to the PIGS capital stock is determined with 0.78.32 The coeﬃcient
estimate for the spatial lag of the PIGS stock, moreover, while positive, does not
gain statistical signiﬁcance, rejecting that PIGS exert a signiﬁcant impact on the
number of new ﬁrm foundations in neighboring municipalities.
Table 3: Spatial Lag, Inverse Distance Weights
Radius, Spatial Lag 20km 40km
(1) (2)
Local Business Tax -0.0121** -0.0095**
(0.0050) (0.0043)
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0149** 0.0065
(0.0061) (0.0064)
PIGS Stock 0.0223*** 0.0154*
(0.0079) (0.0086)
PIGS Stock, Spatial Lag 0.0154 -0.0396
(0.0276) (0.0317)
N 70653 70653
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X
Controls X X
Control Functions X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Speciﬁcations (1) and
(2) reestimate the baseline model in Speciﬁcation (4) of Ta-
ble 2, deﬁning neighboring communities for the calculation
of spatial lags as all municipalities within a 20km and 40km
great distance circle (as opposed to 15km in the baseline
speciﬁcation).
Robustness Checks
Tables 3 to 5 present robustness checks. Firstly, we rerun the models using diﬀe-
rent deﬁnitions of the spatially lagged regressors. The speciﬁcations in Table 3 stick
32An increase in the PIGS capital stock by 1% corresponds to a rise by 0.34 Million Euro on
average (cf. Table 1) and is estimated to trigger a drop in the number of new ﬁrms by 0.78%(=
0.34 · 0.0257). Note, moreover that, as described in the Introduction, we are not aware of
other papers that estimate the link between local PIGS provision and ﬁrm activity. Country-
level estimates in Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) also suggest a positive link between government
spending and ﬁrm activity, which is quantitatively smaller than our estimate though.
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to inverse distance weighting of neighboring communities but increase the group of
neighbors to municipalities within a 20 and 40km radius. Table 4 presents speciﬁca-
tions that reestimate our baseline model, constructing the spatial lags of regressors
based on uniform weights and squared inverse distance weights, again accounting
for neighbors within a 15km, 20km and 40km distance radius respectively. Overall
the results conﬁrm our baseline estimates but suggest that tax competition eﬀects
between neighboring communities quickly fade out in geographic distance.
Table 4: Alternative Weights
Uniform Weights Inverse Distance Squared Weights
15km 20km 40km 15km 20km 40km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Business Tax -0.0132*** -0.0110* -0.0084** -0.0137** -0.0127** -0.0114**
(0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0050)
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0183*** 0.0125* 0.0003 0.0181*** 0.0159** 0.0130*
(0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0070)
PIGS Stock 0.0264*** 0.0211*** 0.0112 0.0258*** 0.0236*** 0.0221***
(0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0083) (0.0082)
PIGS Stock, Spatial Lag 0.0300 0.0061 -0.0509 0.0272 0.0198 -0.0130
(0.0284) (0.0308) (0.0349) (0.0288) (0.0276) (0.0327)
N 70645 70645 70645 70653 70653 70653
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X
Control Variables X X X X X X
Control Functions X X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Speciﬁcations (1)-(3) present robustness checks on the baseline model
speciﬁcation, where the spatial lags of the regressors are calculated using uniform weighting of neighboring juris-
dictions. Speciﬁcations (4)-(6) present robustness checks on the baseline model speciﬁcation, where the spatial lags
of the regressors are calculated using inverse distance squared weighting of neighboring jurisdictions. Speciﬁcations
(1)+(4)/(2)+(5)/(3)+(6) account for neighbors within 15km/20km/40km of the locality centroid.
Moreover, we check on the validity of our instrumental variable strategy. One
obvious concern, when it comes to the RES wind instrument, is that the erection of
wind power plants may directly impact on our dependent variable - either because
new wind power plants are, themselves, counted as new establishments or because
wind power plants exert a direct positive eﬀect on the local economy. We consider
neither to be of importance for our analysis. Firstly, wind turbines have mostly
been erected by individuals (without any full-time employees) and are thus not
counted as new establishments in our analysis (see the deﬁnition of our dependent
variable in Section III). Secondly, we used data on the actual erection of wind
turbines in our sample jurisdictions to crosscheck on that point and deﬁned modiﬁed
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dependent variables, where we substract actually erected turbines from the number
of new establishments in a given municipality and year. The results are reported in
Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) of Table 5.
In Speciﬁcation (2), the dependent variable is the number of new establishments
per municipality and year less 1 in years in which new wind power plants were
erected (hence assuming that new turbines were erected by the same new ﬁrm).33
In Speciﬁcation (3), the dependent variable is the number of newly established
ﬁrms in a municipality and year less the actual number of newly erected wind
turbines (hence assuming that each wind turbine is erected by a separate new ﬁrm).
Note that the sample size diﬀers from the baseline speciﬁcation as we were unable
to merge the wind turbine information to our main data for two German states
(Baden-Württemberg and Saarland).34 For comparison, Speciﬁcation (1) of Table 5
reestimates our baseline model (Speciﬁcation (4) of Table 2) in the restricted sample.
The results indicate that the described modiﬁcation of the dependent variable, in
line with our considerations above, aﬀects coeﬃcient estimates neither qualitatively
nor quantitatively. As spelled out above, a second concern may be that the erection
of wind power plants might have a direct positive eﬀect on the local economy. We
consider this to be highly unlikely as the installation and maintenance of wind
turbines requires highly specialized skills and equipment and is hence organised in
ﬁrms that work on a supra-regional basis.
To further assess the robustness of our ﬁndings, we rerun the analysis with
an alternative instrument. Speciﬁcally, the RES 2000 act - next to subsidies for
33The wind turbine data has been obtained from the operator database (http://www.btrdb.de/).
34Speciﬁcally, access to the Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik was granted separately for individual Ger-
man states by the State Statistical Oﬃces in charge. Data access is organized via a common
data lab of the statistical oﬃces and via remote data access. All states, with the exception of
Baden-Württemberg and Saarland, on top, allowed us to export the aggregate number of ﬁrm
foundations per community and year. As linking the Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik with external in-
formation is restricted to variables that researchers initially applied for, we were unable to merge
in the wind turbine data, which was not part of our initial project proposal. The speciﬁcations
in Table 5 are estimated based on the exported ﬁrm count data for the other states.
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wind energy production - also granted generous subsidies for the production of bio
fuel (see Section 3 for details). As this increased the proﬁts of farmers and the
tax revenues of their host communities, we exploit diﬀerences in the emergence of
revenues and spending between communities with high and low capacities for corn
production after the act was passed for empirical identiﬁcation (see Section 3 for
the deﬁnition of 'capacity for corn production').35 The second stage results are
presented in Column (4) of Table 5 and, reassuringly, turn out to be qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to our baseline estimates.
Table 5: Wind vs. Corn Instrument
Wind Corn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Business Tax -0.0145*** -0.0118** -0.0119** -0.0127**
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0059)
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0152*** 0.0142** 0.0132** 0.0114**
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0062)
Total Capital Stock (in 1M Euro) 0.0288** 0.0222** 0.0251** 0.0310
(0.0113) (0.0097) (0.099) (0.0356)
Total Capital Stock (in 1M Euro), Spatial Lag -0.0455 -0.0277 -0.0425 -0.0764
(0.0389) (0.0233) (0.0317) (0.0509)
N 61054 61054 61054 61054
Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Controls X X X X
Control Functions X X X X
Correction Built Wind Turbines Yes(less 1) YES (less #)
p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Speciﬁcation (1) reestimates the baseline model in a sample without
the states of Baden-Württemberg and Saarland. In Column (2), we report the results for analogous model
speciﬁcations, where the dependent variable is the number of new establishments per municipality and year
minus 1 if at least one new wind turbine has been erected in the respective community in a particular year.
In Column (3), the analogous model is estimated with a dependent variable which is the number of new
establishments per municipality and year minus the actual number of wind turbines built in a jurisdiction
and given year. In Speciﬁcation (4), we instrument community spending with communities' capacity for
corn production instead of wind strength and agricultural space.
Finally note that we ran a jackknife analysis, which conﬁrms that none of our
results is driven by a particular German state (not reported in the paper).
The eﬀect of PIGS on family and transport intensive industries
The analysis so far has been restricted to assessing the eﬀect of the aggregate
PIGS stock on the aggregate number of ﬁrm foundations per jurisdiction and year.
The impact of PIGS on ﬁrm proﬁts, enterpreneurs' wellbeing and, in consequence,
35Speciﬁcally, the corn capacity variable deﬁned in Section 3 is interacted with an indicator for
years after the implementation of the RES 2000 act and, additionally, with a linear time trend
for the post reform years.
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ﬁrm foundation choices may, in turn, well diﬀer across industries and across diﬀerent
types of PIGS. We test for this possibility based on two sets of consideration: Firstly,
many PIGS provided by German municipalities are targeted at households and
speciﬁcally at families with children. This, among others, concerns youth facilities,
education, sports and recreation options, like playgrounds, parks, public swimming
and public soccer courts. While it is individuals who directly beneﬁt from these
PIGS, ﬁrms may capture some of the related rents through lower wage costs (as
workers are willing to work for lower wages in areas with family-related amenities)
or increased worker productivity.36 In the following, we will assess the eﬀect of
such 'family-PIGS' on the number of new ﬁrm foundations in 'family-intensive'
industries. Theoretically, one might expect to see higher own-PIGS responses than in
the baseline model as the considered ﬁrm pool is expected to be particularly strongly
aﬀected by the considered PIGS. In terms of PIGS spillover eﬀects, predictions are
ambiguous. On the one hand, one might expect to see higher positive spillover eﬀects
as commuting of enterpreneurs and workers might imply that municipalities close
to residential communities with attractive family PIGS may become attractive ﬁrm
locations. On the other hand, the busy time schedule of families may counteract
this eﬀect as parents may be reluctant to commute between communities. Moreover,
the beneﬁts of many family-PIGS, like schooling and childcare, exclusively accrue
to households that reside in the PIGS-providing community, potentially further
dampening the emergence of positive spillover eﬀects.37
In the empirical analysis, 'family-PIGS' are deﬁned as PIGS provision related
to schools, recreations and sports, culture and public education, youth services and
public transport. We, moreover, identify 'family-intensive' industries based on ﬁrm-
36Alternatively, enterpreneurs may obtain direct beneﬁts from PIGS provision and may for that
reason be drawn to locate in communities with high levels of 'family-PIGS'.
37Families in Germany are e.g. only eligible to nursery places in their community of residence.
Analogously, school choices tend to be restricted.
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level information on the employment structures of all German establishments provi-
ded in the 'Establishment History Panel' of the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB). Speciﬁcally, we use the waves for 1996 to 2007 to deﬁne 'family-intensity'
according to the fraction of workers per ﬁrm, who are aged between 35 and 49 and
are thus in the age range where individuals commonly live with children.
Following this deﬁnition, Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the re-
sults of control function models where the dependent variable corresponds to the
number of new ﬁrm foundations per community and year in family-intensive and
non-family-intensive industries respectively, deﬁned as 2-digit industries with an
average fraction of 'family-aged' workers above and below the median respectively.
Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) rerun the same speciﬁcations using as dependent variable
the number of new ﬁrms in 2-digit industries with an average family-intensity above
and below the 75th percentile of the distribution respectively.
To avoid that our estimated 'family-PIGS' eﬀect is confounded by - potentially
correlated - PIGS provision in other dimensions, we subsume the PIGS stock related
to communities' voluntary PIGS spending in other dimensions in one variable and
include it as a control regressor in the indicated speciﬁcations. The family-related
and other PIGS stock variables are thereby instrumented based on a shift-share-
approach (see Bartik (1991)), where the wind instrument is weighted by the fraction
of the PIGS stock in the two PIGS categories relative to the overall PIGS stock in
the pre-sample period 1997 in the ﬁrst stage regressions.
The results suggest that family-related PIGS exert a signiﬁcant and quantita-
tively large eﬀect on the number of ﬁrm foundations in family-intensive industries,
while the eﬀects on ﬁrm foundations in non-family intensive industries are small
and statistically insigniﬁcant. Speciﬁcation (1) (Speciﬁcation (3)) suggests that an
increase in the stock of family-related PIGS by 1% (corresponding to an increase by
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0.2 Mio Euros, on average) raises the number of ﬁrm foundations in industries with
a family-intensity above the median (75th percentile of the distribution) by 1.2%
(2.3%). The coeﬃcient estimate for the spatial lag of family-related PIGS (calcu-
lated based on neighbors within a 15km distance radius and with inverse distance
weights) moreover turns out negative and large in absolute size, suggesting strong
beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀects. The latter result contrasts our baseline ﬁndings, which
suggested no signiﬁcant PIGS spillover eﬀects across borders. As sketched above,
this may reﬂect a reluctance of parents to commute to work or capture that many
family-PIGS can only be captured by households actually residing within commu-
nity borders. Speciﬁcations (1)-(4) in Table B3 in the online appendix corroborate
this evidence and show that similar results emerge when PIGS categories other than
family-intensive PIGS are modelled in detail.38 Note, moreover, that, interestingly,
we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response of family-intensive and non-
family-intensive ﬁrms to changes in the local business tax rate, which indicates that
the two type of ﬁrms do not diﬀer in their general responsiveness to ﬁscal incentives.
As a second strategy, we assess the eﬀect of the provision of public streets on the
number of new ﬁrm foundations in transport intensive industries. The notion behind
this sub-analysis is that transport-intensive ﬁrms are presumed to rely on a functi-
oning road network and that PIGS investment in that dimension, in consequence,
raise the attractiveness of municipalities as a location for ﬁrms in transport-intensive
industries. In the following, we will use the average ratio of material inputs to sa-
les as a proxy for the transport intensity of 2-digit-industries, calculated from ﬁrm
38We again rely on a shift-share-strategy when implementing the control function approach. Note,
moreover, that in the speciﬁcations of Table 7, the coeﬃcient estimates for the spatial lag of
the family-PIGS stock tend to be larger in quantitative terms than the coeﬃcient estimates for
the own eﬀect of the family-PIGS stock. This asymmetry vanishes when the rest of the PIGS
capital stock is modelled in more detail as in Table B3 of the online appendix. Note, moreover,
that the estimates in Table B3 also suggest that ﬁrms in family-intensive sectors react more
sensitively to the building and maintenance of community streets (which may relate to the fact
that short-distances-mobility is important for families and a good infrastructure network reduces
driving times within a locality).
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Table 6: Family and Transport Intensive Industries
Median Pctl(75) Median Pctl(75)
Family Intensive Industries Transport Intensive Industries
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Local Business Tax -0.0120 -0.0138** -0.0092 -0.0135** -0.0162*** -0.0140* -0.0177*** -0.0142***
(0.0099) (0.0059) (0.0257) (0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0049)
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0115 0.0176*** 0.0170 0.0172** 0.0163*** 0.0164* 0.0189** 0.0153**
(0.0122) (0.0068) (0.0330) (0.0072) (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0080) (0.0071)
People Goods 0.0575*** 0.0101 0.1159** 0.0122
(0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0517) (0.0116)
People Goods, Spatial Lag -0.0815* 0.0490* -0.2884*** 0.0449*
(0.0427) (0.0272) (0.1062) (0.0263)
Streets 0.0143 0.0178 0.0163 0.0151
(0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0107)
Streets, Spatial Lag -0.0457 0.0145 -0.0352 -0.0139
(0.0441) (0.0539) (0.0564) (0.0564)
Other Stock 0.0489*** 0.0135 0.0987** 0.0154 0.0177** 0.0212* 0.0205* 0.0191*
(0.0180) (0.0094) (0.0450) (0.0106) (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0103)
Other Stock, Spatial Lag -0.0486 0.0273 -0.1386 0.0251 -0.0116 0.0278 -0.0133 0.0153
(0.0365) (0.0226) (0.0955) (0.0246) (0.0293) (0.0363) (0.0344) (0.0352)
N 54525 70254 34143 70522 68838 66344 63563 69517
Controls X X X X X X X X
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X
Control Functions X X X X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The table presents model speciﬁcations, where the dependent variable is the number of new ﬁrms in (non-
)family-intensive/(non-)transport-intensive industries as deﬁned in the main text. In Speciﬁcations (1) and (2), ﬁrms with a 'family-intensity'
above and below the median are counted, in Speciﬁcations (3) and (4), ﬁrms with a family-intensity above and below the 75th percentile of the
distribution. Analogously, in Speciﬁcations (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the number of new ﬁrms with a transport-intensity above and
below the median, in Speciﬁcations (7) and (8), ﬁrms with a transport-intensity above and below the 75th percentile of the distribution. The
deﬁnition of the spatial lags of the regressors accounts for neighbors within 15km distance and uses inverse distance weights. The deﬁnition
of the 'Streets' regressor corresponds to Section 3, people goods comprise schools, recreations and sports, culture and public education, youth
services and public transport; other goods comprises all other categories described in Section 3. Note that the diﬀerence in the number of
observations across speciﬁcations relates to communities, where the dependent variable takes on the value zero for all sample years, so that
the respective municipality is dropped from the sample.
accounts provided in Bureau van Dijk's DAFNE data.39
Speciﬁcations (5) to (8) of Table 6 report speciﬁcations where the number of
new ﬁrm foundations in transport-intensive and non-transport-intensive industries
respectively is regressed on the value of community streets (constructed based on the
perpetual inventory method sketched in Section 3). In Speciﬁcations (5) and (7), the
dependent variable is the number of new ﬁrm foundations per community and year
in transport-intensive industries, deﬁned as those with a ratio of material inputs over
total sales above the median and the 75th percentile of the distribution respectively.
Inversely, in Speciﬁcations (6) and (8), the dependent variable is the number of
ﬁrm foundations in non-transport intensive industries, deﬁned as industries with
material inputs relative to overall sales below the median and the 75th percentile of
39As ﬁrm coverage in DAFNE is rather poor prior to the mid 2000s, the transport intensity of
ﬁrms is calculated based on data for the year 2009.
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the distribution respectively. Note, moreover, that the control function approach is
again implemented based on the shift-share-strategy described above.
The coeﬃcient estimates for the street regressor turn out small and statistically
insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, suggesting that community streets do not exert
a signiﬁcant impact on the emergence and attraction of new ﬁrms. We consider
this ﬁnding to reﬂect that our analysis only captures expenditures related to the
construction and maintenance of streets within a given municipality. Roads and
highways that cross municipality borders, connect regions and have been shown
by earlier research to impact ﬁrm behavior (see e.g. Moeller and Zierer (2018)), in
turn, fall into the responsibility of higher government tiers. The insigniﬁcant eﬀect of
local street infrastructure on transport-intensive industries might, moreover, reﬂect
that a major fraction of related public spending is assigned to the maintenance of
existing roads instead of the construction of genuinely new infrastructure. Prior
research suggests that, after the core infrastructure is built, ﬁrm beneﬁts related to
such 'marginal' investments tend to be limited (see e.g. Fernald (1999)). For the
sake of completeness, furthermore note that the tax eﬀects on the emergence of new
ﬁrms are again quantitatively similar to our baseline estimates for both subgroups
of ﬁrms.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated the eﬀect of local business taxes and local PIGS pro-
vision on the number and spatial distribution of new ﬁrms. Using Germany as a
testing ground and estimating ﬁxed eﬀects Poisson regressions coupled with a con-
trol function approach, we ﬁnd that both, local business taxes and PIGS provision
exert a quantitatively signiﬁcant impact on the number of new ﬁrm foundations in
the policy-changing jurisdiction. The ﬁndings hence suggest that local ﬁscal poli-
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cies do change ﬁrm behaviour. Our results, moreover, point to beggar-thy-neighbor
externalities: Reductions in local business tax rates are found to strongly lower
the number of news ﬁrms in neighboring communities, implying that the aggregate
number of ﬁrms remains unchanged. Analogous beggar-thy-neighbor externalities
emerge in the PIGS dimension - for subsets of ﬁrms and PIGS. Evidence on such
spillovers informs policy debates about the assignment of tax and spending rights
to government tiers - supporting proponents of a stronger centralization of policy
instruments.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Theoretical Model
Proof of Lemma 1. Under the assumption that m(1) is suﬃciently high,
∆(0) = (t2 − t1)V +
(
(1− t1)B1(c1, c2)− (1− t2)B2(c1, c2)
)
+ (1− γt2)m(1)− (1− γt1)m(0) > 0
and
∆(1) = (t2 − t1)V +
(
(1− t1)B1(c1, c2)− (1− t2)B2(c1, c2)
)
+ (1− γt2)m(0)− (1− γt1)m(1) < 0.
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists x¯ with ∆(x¯) = 0. Because
∂∆(x)
∂x
= −(2 + γ(t1 + t2))m′(x) < 0,
∆(x) is monotone and thus x¯ is unique and ∆(x) > 0 if x < x¯ and ∆(x) < 0 if x > x¯.
Proof of Lemma 2. x¯ is implicitly deﬁned by ∆(x¯) = 0. By the implicit function theorem, it is
suﬃcient to consider ∂∆(x)/∂p for p ∈ {t1, t2, c1, c2}.
1. For the ﬁrst part of Lemma 2, consider
∂∆(x)
∂t1
= −(V +B1(c1, c2)− γm(x)) < 0,
∂∆(x)
∂t2
= (V +B2(c1, c2)− γm(1− x)) > 0,
where the signs follow from
(V +Bj(c1, c2)− γm(·)) = pi
∗ + (1− γm(·))
1− tj > 0,
where pi∗ is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm given an optimal location and entry choice.
2. For the second part of the lemma, consider
∂∆(x)
∂c1
= (1− t1)∂B1
∂c1
− (1− t2)∂B2
∂c1
> 0 if (1− t1)∂B1
∂c1
> (1− t2)∂B2
∂c1
,
∂∆(x)
∂c2
= (1− t1)∂B1
∂c2
− (1− t2)∂B2
∂c2
> 0 if (1− t1)∂B1
∂c2
> (1− t2)∂B2
∂c2
,
as stated in Lemma 2.
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Appendix B: Estimates Baseline Model
Table B1: Baseline Poisson Regressions
Poisson Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3)
Local Business Tax -0.0010** -0.0009*
(0.0005) (0.0005)
PIGS Stock 0.0014*** 0.0013**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
N 70653 70653 70653
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X
Controls X X X
Control Functions X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table B1 presents the results for variants of the baseline model in Equation
3. While all speciﬁcations absorb time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across jurisdictions
and includes a full set of state-year ﬁxed eﬀects and the control variables outlined in Section
3, Speciﬁcation (1) (Speciﬁcation (2)) includes the local business tax (the PIGS capital stock)
as the sole policy regressor. The point estimate for the local business tax regressor is −0.001
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Quantitatively, a 10% increase of the mean local
business tax rate is suggested to decrease the expected count of ﬁrm foundations by 3.39% (33.9×
0.1%).40 Speciﬁcation (2) yields a positive and signiﬁcant signiﬁcant point estimate of 0.0014 for
the PIGS regressor. Quantitatively, a 10% increase of the PIGS Stock increases the number of ﬁrm
foundations by 0.43% (3.044 × 0.14%). Combining both the tax rate and our proxy for the total
capital stock in one regression (see speciﬁcation (3)) yields similar results. Hence, using a simple
Poisson regression to capture the eﬀects of tax rates and expenditures for PIGS on the number of
ﬁrm foundations yields signiﬁcant but moderate point estimates.
40Note that, as outlined in the main text, the local business tax is measured in local business
tax points, with an average of 339 local business tax points in our sample. To arrive at the
local business tax in percentage points, the variable is multiplied with a so-called 'Messzahl',
which took on the value of 5% for incorporated businesses and for income of non-incorporated
businesses above EUR 48,000 during our sample period.
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Table B2: First Stage Estimates
Tax Stock Tax, Spat. Lag Stock, Spat. Lag
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reference Tax Dummy 8.6476*** 0.1377 1.8179*** -0.1767
0.7791 0.2669 0.3563 0.1558
Reference Tax Dummy, Spatial Lag 18.7990*** -2.7488*** 22.9233*** -1.1876***
1.8893 0.6574 1.1752 0.4198
Wind X Agriculture X Reform -0.0014 0.0063*** -0.0004 -0.0006***
0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0002
Wind X Agriculture X Reform X Trend -0.0002 0.0005** -0.0003 0.0000
0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001
Wind X Agriculture X Reform, Spatial Lag -0.0070*** -0.0024** -0.0074*** 0.0041***
0.0024 0.0012 0.0011 0.0005
Wind X Agriculture X Reform X Trend, Spatial Lag -0.0016** -0.0009** -0.0012*** -0.0009***
0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003
Observations 70653 70653 70653 70653
F-Statistic 96.33*** 16.71*** 668.37*** 131.84***
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Control Variables X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The table presents ﬁrst stage regressions for our baseline control function approach,
regressing localities' business tax rate (Column (1)), PIGS capital stock (Column (2)), the spatial lag of the local business
tax rate (Column (3)) and the spatial lag of the PIGS capital stock (Column (4)) on the instruments and the control
regressors as well as their spatial lag. Note that spatial lags are calculated accounting for neighboring localities within a
15km radius and inverse distance weights. 'Reference Tax Dummy' moreover is a dummy variable indicating whether the
reference tax from the ﬁscal equalization scheme is larger or smaller than the community's local business tax rate in 1998
(see Section IV for details). 'Wind' and 'Agriculture' capture the communities' exposure to wind and its free agricultural
space as described in Section IV. 'Reform' is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 for years after 2000 and 'Trend'
is a variable that takes on the value 0 in the reform year 2000 and values 1, 2, 3 and so on for the following years 2001,
2002, 2003 etc.. Note, moreover, that all models, furthermore, include Wind X Reform, Wind X Reform X Trend and the
spatial lag of these two variables.
Table B3: Family and Transport Intensive Industries
Median Pctl(75) Median Pctl(75)
Family Intensive Industries Transport Intensive Industries
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Local Business Tax -0.0164* -0.0134** -0.0262 -0.0132** -0.0150*** -0.0119 -0.0169*** -0.0122***
0.0096 0.0054 0.0244 0.0054 0.0038 0.0073 0.0065 0.0046
Local Business Tax, Spatial Lag 0.0156 0.0179*** 0.0489 0.0172** 0.0186*** 0.0161** 0.0209** 0.0163***
0.0136 0.0068 0.0306 0.0073 0.0062 0.0079 0.0083 0.0059
People Goods 0.0611** -0.0071 0.1512** -0.0044 0.0052 -0.0069 0.0185 -0.0087
0.0288 0.0169 0.0604 0.0195 0.0133 0.0165 0.0193 0.0185
People Goods, Spatial Lag -0.0487 0.0109 -0.1785** 0.0100 -0.0037 0.0088 -0.0145 0.0116
0.0447 0.0273 0.0762 0.0303 0.0234 0.0284 0.0276 0.0287
Streets 0.0481** 0.0014 0.1140** 0.0035 0.0102 0.0019 0.0181 0.0012
0.0236 0.0135 0.0507 0.0158 0.0106 0.0137 0.0157 0.0142
Streets, Spatial Lag -0.0550 0.0063 -0.1484** 0.0052 -0.0173 0.0176 -0.0256 0.0113
0.0424 0.0237 0.0739 0.0273 0.0208 0.0263 0.0242 0.0228
Economic Promotion -0.1330 0.1435 -0.4632 0.1376 0.0837 0.1630* 0.0019 0.1756*
0.1380 0.0882 0.2934 0.0899 0.0703 0.0888 0.0839 0.1014
Economic Promotion, Spatial Lag 0.1334 0.0072 1.1582* -0.0042 -0.0197 0.0922 0.0317 0.0243
0.3349 0.1722 0.6538 0.1730 0.1556 0.2002 0.1935 0.1929
Other Stock 0.1165 -0.0581 0.2859 -0.0524 -0.0242 -0.0638 0.0187 -0.0707
0.0997 0.0665 0.2350 0.0620 0.0536 0.0696 0.0563 0.0748
Other Stock, Spatial Lag -0.0631 0.1538 -0.0561 0.1419 0.0912 0.1673 0.0382 0.1791
0.1780 0.1114 0.3617 0.1175 0.1175 0.1133 0.1350 0.1137
N 54525 70254 34143 70522 68838 66344 63563 69517
Control Function Errors X X X X X X X X
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X
Control Functions X X X X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The table presents model speciﬁcations, where the dependent variable is the number of ﬁrms in (non-
)family-intensive/(non-)transport-intensive industries as deﬁned in the main text. In Speciﬁcations (1) and (2), the number of ﬁrms with
a 'family-intensity' above and below the median are counted (see deﬁnition in the main text), in Speciﬁcations (3) and (4), ﬁrms with a
family-intensity above and below the 75th percentile of the distribution. Analogously, in Speciﬁcations (5) and (6), the dependent variable is
the number of ﬁrms in industries with a transport-intensity above and below the median (see deﬁnition in the main text), in Speciﬁcations
(7) and (8), ﬁrms in industries with a transport-intensity above and below the 75th percentile are counted. The deﬁnition of the spatial lags
of the regressors accounts for neigbors within 15km distance and weights are based on inverse distance. The deﬁnition of the 'Streets' and
'Economic Promotion' regressors corresponds to Section 3, people goods comprise schools, recreations and sports, culture and public education,
youth services and public transport and 'other stock' all other categories described in Section 3. Note that the diﬀerence in the number of
observations across speciﬁcations relates to communities, where the dependent variable takes on the value zero for all sample years, so that
the respective locality is dropped from the sample.
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